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2 March 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Department review
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***Communist China - USSR - Nuclear Weapons:**

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[redacted] Communist China will produce a plutonium weapon in "two or three years" and will then be "prepared to fight a war!"

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[redacted] Peiping still holds the view that a nuclear war would destroy capitalism and leave the field clear for Chinese survivors to build a new world.

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25X1 [redacted] Moscow had taken "extraordinary measures" to convince the Chinese they were mistaken, had stopped nuclear assistance to China "several years ago," and had never given Peiping help with or information concerning a diffusion plant.

[These remarks may be designed to portray the Chinese as nuclear maniacs and, by contrast, to underscore Russian "responsibility" and "sincerity" in seeking agreement with the West on nuclear issues.]

[Last January, Soviet members of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna reportedly thought the Chinese could explode their first nuclear device sometime in 1963. It is not known how well informed these members are.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Pakistan: Political opposition to the Ayub regime will be greatly strengthened by an incident of 1 March in which Karachi police fired on striking workers, killing four and wounding six others.

Militant opposition leaders may try to exploit antiregime reactions by provoking additional incidents. The government had already been concerned over possible unrest in East Pakistan, where the National Assembly is scheduled to convene on 8 March, and it had taken steps to intimidate its opponents.

Ayub may now impose additional controls to prevent further disturbances, or possibly postpone the scheduled assembly session. On the other hand, the government may have actually provoked this incident in order to have a justification for the reimposition of martial law.

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Brazil: [President Goulart's opposition to OAS action against Castro may not be as adamant as heretofore believed.]

[In mid-February, he told the US ambassador that should the US succeed in obtaining sufficient OAS support for radical economic and diplomatic sanctions against Cuba, Brazil would respect its treaty commitments and, although reluctantly, join in the effort to implement them.]

[Preliminary Brazil-US financial negotiations are now under way.]

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NOTES

Cuba: [redacted] 25X1
showed all 42 of the MIG-21 (Fishbed) aircraft known
to be in Cuba assembled at the Camilo Cienfuegos Air-
field near Santa Clara in central Cuba. About 15 of
these aircraft had previously been stationed at San
Antonio de los Banos southwest of Havana. The rea-
son for such an assembly is not known. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1
Syria: [redacted] 25X1
Army pressure on the Qudsi-Azm regime
remains high, and a power play may be imminent.
The demands of one army faction for the ouster of
Prime Minister Azm and for Syrian federation with
Iraq may precipitate a move by either conservative
or pro-Nasir elements opposing merger. *Mean-
while, Baghdad's propaganda pressure on the Syrian
regime is increasing. [redacted]

Peru: [redacted] various 25X1
extremist groups, including Communists, are planning
to resume terrorist activities during the first week in
March. Targets singled out for attack include police
garrisons, banks, and petroleum facilities. US-owned
properties are also said to be marked for sabotage.

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USSR: The USSR is taking steps to avoid the African student troubles which have developed in East European Satellites. Several "unsatisfactory" students have been expelled from the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow and have already left the country, according to the university's rector.

Senegal: A constitutional referendum to be held on 3 March will provide an indication of the prospects for stability in Senegal. Although the proposed increase in the powers of President Senghor is likely to be approved, a sizable negative vote would indicate that Senghor has alienated many of the local leaders on whom his position ultimately depends. Those already disturbed by Senghor's plans include some conservative legislators who stood by him last December when he ousted Prime Minister Dia, Dia's own more radical supporters, and members of three small opposition parties.

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Algeria-USSR: Algeria has sent 48 army officers to the Soviet Union for training--the first sizable contingent to go to the bloc since Algeria became independent last July. The officers probably responded to a Soviet offer to train Algerian student engineers in a 30-month course. The offer was publicized in late January by the Algerian Defense Ministry's directorate of telecommunications, despite a privately stated preference of Algerian military authorities for Western, especially French, equipment and training.

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 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
 Commander in Chief, Atlantic
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 The Director, The Joint Staff
 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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